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The common saying “time is money” reflects the widespread belief in many people’s every-
day life that time is valuable like money. Psychologically and neurophysiologically, however,
these concepts seem to be quite different. This research replicates prior behavioral inves-
tigations by showing that merely mentioning “time” (compared to merely mentioning
“money”) leads participants to evaluate a product more positively. Beyond this finding, the
present functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiment provides novel insight
into the neurophysiological underpinnings of this behavioral effect by showing that more
positive product evaluations in the time primes (compared to money primes) are preceded
by increased activation in the insula. Our data, therefore, support the idea of a time mind-
set that is different from a money mindset. Studies on the functional neuroanatomy of
the insula have implicated this brain area in distinct but related psychological phenomena
such as urging, addiction, loss aversion, and love. These functions imply greater personal
connection between the consumer and a target subject or object and, thus, help explain
why time-primed consumers rate products more positively.
Keywords: time-versus-money effect, priming, product evaluations, insula, functional magnetic resonance imaging,
consumer neuroscience, decision neuroscience
INTRODUCTION
Franklin (1748/1961) once wrote:“Remember time is money,”sug-
gesting that both concepts are economically equivalent (Becker,
1965; Okada and Hoch, 2004; DeVoe and Pfeffer, 2007; Zauber-
man et al., 2009). Yet, in psychological terms, time and money seem
to be quite different. Several investigations have provided evidence
that the concepts of “time” and “money” alter behavior in different
ways. For example, Saini and Monga (2008) showed that decision-
making is more heuristic in situations that require spending time
than in situations that involve spending money. The authors
argued that heuristics are used more for time because consumers’
time expenditures are harder to account for than those for money.
Liu and Aaker (2008) explored the behavioral consequences of
time compared to money in the context of charitable giving, show-
ing that asking for time first (i.e., the “time-ask”), compared to
asking for money first (i.e., the “money-ask”), increases the sub-
sequent amount of money donated to the charity. The authors
argued that time and money each may have activated a “mindset”
that is different from the other: while thoughts of spending time
for the charity may have activated a more emotional “mindset,” in
which collective motives, goals of emotional well-being, and beliefs
of personal happiness became salient, thoughts of giving money
to the charity could have activated a value-maximization “mind-
set” that separated the donor from the charity psychologically and
decreased beliefs of personal happiness (in this research, we use the
term “mindset” following the work of Mogilner and Aaker, 2009).
Building on the “time-ask effect,” Mogilner and Aaker (2009)
revealed a “time-versus-money effect,” in which a time prime led
to more favorable product attitudes. The authors contended that
the activation of the concept of time (versus money) increased
the focus on product experiences (versus product possessions)
and, thus, augmented a personal connection between consumer
and product. This connection, in turn, improved attitudes toward
the product, increased the willingness-to-pay for the product, and
influenced consumers’ decisions to actually buy the product.
While prior research has made progress in increasing the under-
standing of the differential behavioral effects of time versus money,
the psychological and neurophysiological underpinnings of prim-
ing consumers with time compared to those of priming them with
money are much less clear. For example, while Liu and Aaker
(2008) argued that priming time leads to an emotional mind-
set while priming money triggers a value-maximization mindset,
other investigators have provided some opposing evidence. In par-
ticular, Dunn et al. (2008) showed that spending money on others
as compared to spending it on oneself promotes happiness, which
indicates the involvement of an emotional mindset rather than
a value-maximization one. As such, it is necessary to shed more
light on the underlying neurophysiological mechanisms of time
and money in order to understand how these concepts operate
psychologically and differentially affect downstream behavior.
The present research utilizes functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) to investigate the neurophysiological underpin-
nings of time primes versus money primes and their consequences
for product evaluation. fMRI offers some methodological advan-
tages over self-report measurement as it (1) permits interpretation
of psychological processes in the brain as they are taking place,(2)
enables measurement of non-conscious processes, and (3) allows
for localization and differentiation of concepts that may seem
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subjectively similar but are actually processed differently (Shiv,
2007; Reimann et al., 2011). For the present research, these three
advantages translate into the ability topinpoint different activation
patterns before, during, and after either time or money is primed;
to detect processes that operate outside of participants’ awareness;
and to differentiate the processes underlying the two mindsets.
In this research, we replicate prior behavioral research
(Mogilner and Aaker, 2009) by showing that merely mentioning”
time” (compared to merely mentioning “money”) leads partici-
pants to more positively evaluate a product. More importantly, we
provide novel insight into the neurophysiological underpinnings
of time versusmoneyby showing that these positive product evalu-
ations in the time condition (as compared to themoney condition)
are preceded by increased activation in the insula. The insula (also
referred to as the insular cortex or the insular lobe) is a brain
area that has been found to be a crucial mechanism in diverse but
related psychological phenomena such as urging and addiction
(Naqvi and Bechara, 2009), loss aversion (Knutson and Bossaerts,
2007; Knutson et al., 2007), interpersonal love (Bartels and Zeki,
2000, 2004; Beauregard et al., 2009), and brand love (Reimann
et al., 2012). These functions are conceptually closely related to
Mogilner andAaker’s (2009) notion of a time-versus-money effect,
which argues in favor of a greater personal connection between
consumer and product right after time primes than right after
money primes.
In the next section, we present the results of a content analysis
on both the neurophysiological correlates and the psychological
functions that underlie the concepts of time and money. Follow-
ing this content analysis, we present an fMRI experiment in which
participants engage in a behavioral product-rating task while their
blood-oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) responses are recorded.
THE NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL BASES OF TIME AND MONEY
The majority of studies that investigated the neurophysiological
underpinnings of the concept of timehave focusedon timepercep-
tion and internal time durationmeasurement. Using the keywords
“fMRI,” “time,” “time perception,” “time psychology,” and “inter-
nal clock” to identify relevant studies. Table 1 summarizes the
results of a number of fMRI studies in which brain areas were
identified for specific time-related functions. For example, pre-
vious investigations provided initial evidence for an association
between time perception and increased activation of the insula
(Craig, 2009; Wittmann, 2009; Wittmann and van Wassenhove,
2009; Wittmann et al., 2010; van Wassenhove et al., 2011). Other
studies have identified several different brain areas in which time
duration measurement may be processed, including the posterior
parietal cortex (Bueti et al., 2008), the prefrontal cortex (Rubia and
Smith,2004; Lewis andMiall, 2006), and the fronto-striatal circuits
(Harrington et al., 2004;Hinton andMeck, 2004). In summary, the
concept of time and time-related phenomena (e.g., time percep-
tion)have been associatedwith activation changes in theprefrontal
cortex (we identified ten studies); the insula, parietal cortex, and
putamen (five studies each); the caudate, frontal gyrus,operculum,
striatum, and temporal gyrus (three studies each); the parietal lob-
ule and the supplementarymotor area (two studies each) as well as
the cingulate cortex, cerebellum, declive, hippocampus, intrapari-
etal sulcus, orbitofrontal cortex, parahippocampus, precuneus,
semilunar lobule, sensorimotor cortex, supra-marginal gyrus, and
thalamus (one study each).
The neurophysiological underpinnings of the concept of
money have been subject to far more studies than those of time.
Using the keywords “fMRI,” “money,” “money perception,” and
“money psychology”to locate relevant studies.Table 2 summarizes
the results of several fMRI studies in which brain areas were iden-
tified for money-related functions. For example, it was found that
the mere anticipation of monetary gains activates the ventral and
dorsal striatum, anterior thalamus, anterior insula, cortical motor
regions, and the cerebellar vermis (Knutson et al., 2003). Further-
more, the ventral striatum and the insula have been implicated
mainly in the processing of concrete monetary rewards (Kuh-
nen and Knutson, 2005). Another investigation revealed that (1)
fronto-parietal regions (i.e., regions of the lateral prefrontal cortex
and posterior parietal cortex) elicit greater activation for delayed
monetary rewards, (2) limbic and paralimbic cortical structures
(i.e., the ventral striatum, medial prefrontal cortex, and posterior
cingulate cortex) reveal greater activation for immediately avail-
able rewards, and (3) that fronto-parietal regions show greater
activation for both immediate and delayed monetary rewards
(McClure et al., 2004). In summary, the concept of money and
money-related phenomena (e.g., monetary reward) have previ-
ously mainly been related to activation changes in the prefrontal
cortex (we identified eight studies); the cingulate cortex, nucleus
accumbens (seven studies each); the insula, striatum, and thala-
mus (six studies each); the amygdala, dorsal caudate, and frontal
cortex (five studies each); the orbitofrontal cortex (four studies);
the midbrain and putamen (three studies each); the frontal gyrus,
globus pallidus, parietal lobule, and precuneus (two studies each)
as well as the cerebellar vermis, cerebellum, frontal pole, fusiform
gyrus, hippocampus, hypothalamus, operculum,medial temporal
lobe, motor cortex, orbital gyrus, and the precentral gyrus (one
study each).
While these studies provide interesting insights into the neu-
rophysiological processes underlying either time or money, to our
knowledge no previous study has directly compared the neuro-
physiology of time primes with that of money primes. Following
prior behavioral researchon the time-versus-money effect inprod-
uct evaluations (Mogilner and Aaker, 2009), we would expect a
greater emotionalmindset for time primes than formoney primes,
because the concept of time seems to boost the formation and
maintenance of close personal connections between consumer
and product to a greater extent than a money mindset. Specific
brain areas have been associated with emotional processing in
prior research (Bechara andDamasio,2005;ReimannandBechara,
2010;ReimannandZimbardo,2011). The aforementioned content
analysis identified several of these emotional brain areas, including
the insula, the amygdala, and parts of the prefrontal cortex.
But, why should either time or money be associated with a
higher degree of activation in these emotional brain regions? Both
money (Dunn et al., 2008; Vohs et al., 2008) and time (Sheldon
and Elliot, 1999; Mogilner, 2010) can foster well-being and elicit
an emotional mindset, and can, therefore, lead to stronger urg-
ings to recreate or maintain this state. Indeed, money can possess
a drug-like character (Roll et al., 2000; Lea and Webley, 2006),
which may explain why people have an urge for it. On the other
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hand, it has been argued that time has greater emotional mean-
ing than money (Mogilner and Aaker, 2009) and that money even
weakens the emotional link to objects as well as to people (Vohs
et al., 2006, 2008; Liu and Aaker, 2008). Further, when asked to
think about traveling back in time, people tend to forget about
negative aspects from their past and instead remember positive
situations and feelings (Carstensen et al., 2000), as if they have
an urge for the “good old times.” As such, when primed with
time (versus money), reminders of positive feelings might elicit
a stronger emotional mindset, lead to a higher degree of urging
to recreate or maintain this emotional state, and positively influ-
ence downstream product attitudes. Yet, it is important to note
that while the present research builds on the notions of previous
research (e.g., Mogilner and Aaker, 2009), it is also exploratory
in nature. As such, we acknowledge that alternative arguments on
whether time or money elicit greater emotional responses can be
brought forward.
One brain area has been associated with the aforementioned
functions – that is, urging and processing feelings of personal
connectedness. For several decades, research in functional neu-
roanatomy has held that the insula is crucial in the integration
of bodily information into emotional and motivational func-
tions (Mesulam and Mufson, 1982). Humans perceive feelings
from their bodies, which are fed into an afferent neural system
that represents all aspects of the physiological condition of the
physical body (Craig, 2002). For example, perceiving facial expres-
sions ranging from sad to happy can trigger bodily responses,
which in turn are associated with insula activation (Britton et al.,
2006). Subsequently, the insula integrates these bodily states into
conscious feelings and decision-making processes (Bechara and
Damasio, 2005; Reimann and Bechara, 2010; Reimann and Zim-
bardo, 2011). The insula has also been shown a crucial brain region
in urging and addiction (Naqvi and Bechara, 2009) as well as – in
more applied domains – in loss aversion (Knutson and Bossaerts,
2007; Knutson et al., 2007), interpersonal love (Bartels and Zeki,
2000, 2004; Beauregard et al., 2009), and brand love (Reimann
et al., 2012).
These investigations provide compelling evidence on certain
insula functions that conceptually map the psychological func-
tions of the time-versus-money effect. As an important word of
caution, however, we acknowledge that like most prior cognitive
neuroscience research, the present study relies on reverse inference
in that activation of a particular brain area (insula) is interpreted
as support for engagement of particular psychological processes
(urging, personal connection). In dealing with this issue, we fol-
lowed the recommendations by Poldrack (2006) and reported task
characteristics and showed replication of prior behavioral evi-
dence. Yet, we recognize that the breath of functions associated
with the insula leave room for interpretation. As such, one can
only hold the insula responsible for its most basic function – that
is, integration of bodily information into emotional and motiva-
tional functions (Mesulam and Mufson, 1982) beyond which the
particular psychological process becomes less clear.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The present experiment investigates the question of whether the
activation of the concept of either time or money leads to distinct
neurophysiological responses, which in turn may help to explain
behavioral differences in how consumers evaluate products. On
the basis of Mogilner and Aaker’s (2009) research, we designed a
behavioral product-rating task in which participants engaged in
product evaluations while undergoing fMRI.
PARTICIPANTS
Forty-four right-handed, healthy subjects (23 females; M age=
24.8 years, SDage= 4.0 years; ranging from 20 to 44 years) partici-
pated in the study for a compensation of 15 euro. Participants were
recruited from the neuroscience subject pool of a public univer-
sity. The study was approved by the university’s ethics committee,
participants were screened for medical eligibility, and written
informed consent was obtained from each participant prior to the
experiment. Because we focused our analyses on a specific product
(i.e., participants’ wristwatch), subjects were also asked whether
they had bought their current wristwatch themselves. Those par-
ticipants that confirmed having bought their watch themselves
were selected for the study, asked to take a picture of their watch,
and send it to us. Each picture was taken with the watch in the
center in front of a neutral background. Participants were ran-
domly assigned to one of two conditions in this between-subject
experimental design. In one condition, participants were primed
with the concept of time; in the other condition, participants were
primed with the concept of money. One participant was excluded
from subsequent data analyses because of extensive head motion
during the brain scan. It is important to note that we used the same
procedure not only for the wristwatch, on which we focused our
subsequent analyses, but also for three other products (i.e., mobile
phone, MP3 player, and laptop computer).
SCAN PREPARATION AND BEHAVIORAL TASK
Before entering the brain scanner, participants underwent a short
training version of the task to alleviate task-related confusion.
Next, participants received the initial prime. We employed two
established priming techniques (Strack et al., 1985; Dunn and
Schweitzer, 2005; Lee et al., 2009), one outside the brain scan-
ner and one inside the brain scanner. Outside the brain scanner,
participants were given 5 min to write about anything that came to
their minds when thinking about one of the two concepts. Before
participants were placed inside the scanner, we ensured that all
subjects were clear about what they were asked to do and what
they were asked to think of. That is, in the money condition,
we ensured participants had thought about the amount spent on
their wristwatch, and in the time condition, we ensured partic-
ipants had thought about the time span they had owned their
wristwatch. Inside the brain scanner, word primes that aimed at
inducing one mindset or the other were given visually (Burnham,
2000; Bargh et al., 2001; Mogilner et al., 2008; Mogilner and Aaker,
2009). Participants were each placed supine inside a full-body 3.0 T
Siemens Magnetom Trio scanner (manufactured by Siemens AG
in Erlangen, Germany) fitted with a 12-channel matrix head coil.
Participants were presented with the full version of the product-
rating task while resting on their backs. Task stimuli were projected
into the scanner; participants could see the stimuli in a mirror
located directly before their eyes. The task consisted of 15 trials
with five phases each to generate a sufficient number of volumes
www.frontiersin.org October 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 372 | 13
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for the neuroimaging data analyses. For presentation of the task
stimuli and accurate recording of participants’ product ratings,
E-Prime Professional software, version 2.0.8.74 (manufactured by
Psychology Software Tools Inc. in Pittsburg, PA, USA) was used.
Each participant saw a series of seven word primes (presented
for 10 s each). In the time condition, participants saw time, to have
time, win time, time management, enjoy time, use time, and time
again. In the money condition, participants were shown money,
to have money, win money, money management, enjoy money, use
money, and money again. It is important to note that we used
words and phrases representing the general concepts of time and
money rather than a speciﬁc amount of timeor a speciﬁcmonetary
possession. In summary, in our study, we activated the concepts
of either time or money through the use of mental priming tech-
niques, which heightened the salience of either time or money.
Thus, priming acted as a reminder of both concepts (Vohs et al.,
2006; Liu and Aaker, 2008; Mogilner and Aaker, 2009).
The initial word priming was followed by the behavioral rat-
ing task, which consisted of a repeated ﬁve-step trial (Figure 1).
First, for 8 s, participants were asked either “How much Time have
you spent on your wristwatch?” or “How much Money have you
spent on your wristwatch?” (“priming phase”). Second, for 10 s,
participants were prompted to think about the product with the
question “What comes to your mind when thinking of your wrist-
watch?” (“thinking phase”). During this phase, participants were
also shown the picture of their own wristwatch. Third, for 4 s,
participants were told to prepare themselves to rate their wrist-
watch (“preparation phase”). Fourth, for 4 s, participants rated
their wristwatch on a ﬁve-point Likert-type semantic differential
scale from unfavorable to favorable by pressing one of ﬁve buttons
on a response box (“rating phase”). The lowest possible rating was
given with the thumb of the right hand and consecutive higher
ratings were given with the next ﬁnger going to the right. Fifth and
ﬁnally, a ﬁxation cross appeared for 3 s and ended each trial (“ﬁx-
ation phase”) before the next trial started. The task timing was
in line with previous research on mood and emotion induction
(e.g., Isen et al., 1976; Isen and Gorgoglione, 1983). The trial was
repeated three times. BOLD signal changes were recorded during
the whole task.
NEUROIMAGING DATA COLLECTION
We applied standard neuroimaging procedures (e.g., Reimann
et al., 2010, 2011; Kable, 2011). For anatomical neuroimag-
ing, we ran (1) a brief scan for land-marking and (2)
a high-resolution whole-brain magnetization-prepared rapid
gradient-echo (MPRAGE) sequence. MPRAGE sequence parame-
ters were: echo time (TE)/repetition time (TR)/inversion time
(TI)= 4.77/2,500/1,100ms, ﬂip angle= 7˚, matrix= 256× 256,
ﬁeld of view (FOV)= 256mm, slice thickness= 1mm with-
out gap. For functional neuroimaging, a time series of 130
volumes with 34 slices in the sagittal plane was collected in
an interleaved sequence, using single-shot gradient-echo planar
imaging (TR= 2,000ms, TE= 30ms, ﬂip angle= 80˚, resolu-
tion= 3.5mm× 3.5mm× 3.5mm, and FOV= 224mm, 64× 64
matrix) and allowing for whole-brain coverage in a relatively short
period of time. Participants were given earplugs to reduce the
distraction of scanner noise and participants’ head movements
were minimized with foam pads.
FIGURE 1 | Product-rating task.
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NEUROIMAGING DATA ANALYSIS
For the neuroimaging data analysis, BrainVoyager QX software,
version 2.3 (manufactured by Brain Innovation B.V. in Maastricht,
Netherlands) was used. A number of preprocessing steps were
performed on the functional data prior to the statistical analy-
sis. For each participant, we used standard methods of analysis
(e.g., DeBettencourt et al., 2011; Hammer et al., 2011), including:
(1) exclusion of the first three scans per run from the analysis
to ensure that steady-state tissue magnetization was reached and,
therefore, to permit T1-equilibration effects; (2) incremental lin-
ear trend removal to eliminate scanner-related signal drifts; (3)
temporal high-pass filtering to remove temporal frequencies (i.e.,
scanner- and physiology-related noise) lower than three cycles
per run; and (4) a rigid-body algorithm, which rotates and trans-
lates each functional volume in three-dimensional space in order
to correct for small head movements between scans. The data
was spatially smoothed with a three-dimensional Gaussian filter
(i.e., 4 mm full-width at half maximum). Functional neuroimages
were co-registered to the anatomical images and interpolated to
cubic voxels. For anatomical orientation, the three-dimensional
T1-weighted scans were used to overlay the statistical maps.
To enable comparison among participants, both anatomical and
functional volumes were spatially normalized into Talairach-type
space (Talairach and Tournoux, 1988).
In line with prior priming and emotion induction research (e.g.,
Damasio et al., 2000) and because the study aimed at identifying
the neurophysiological underpinnings of time versus money, we
focused our analyses of the neuroimaging data on the” priming
phase”; that is, those 8 s in which participants were asked “How
much Time [or: Money] have you spent on your wristwatch?” and
right before participants rated the product more positively in the
time condition than in the money condition. BOLD responses
during the time priming phase was directly compared to partic-
ipants’ BOLD responses during the money priming phase. This
approach of directly comparing time with money conditions is
not only following the analyses of behavioral data by Mogilner
and Aaker (2009) but is also in line with recent fMRI research,
which directly compared different emotional states (e.g., Ander-
sen et al., 2001) and different mindsets (e.g., Dietvorst et al., 2009)
with each other.
First, we analyzed data on the single-subject level. Specifically,
fixed-effects whole-brain general linear model (GLM) analyses
were performed, using a regression model consisting of 14 pre-
dictors. A set of seven predictors corresponded to the specific
phases of the task (i.e., an introduction phase, the first priming
phase, and the five trial phases), while a set of seven confounding
predictors captured motion-related artifacts and artificial activity
within the ventricles (Weissenbacher et al., 2009). The BOLD sig-
nal change for each predictor was modeled by using a two-gamma
hemodynamic response function (Friston et al., 1998).
Second, after creating statistical parametric maps for each par-
ticipant by applying linear contrasts to the predictor estimates (i.e.,
betaweights), a random-effects GLM analysis was performed at the
group level. At the group level, we employed a summary statistics
approach, which uses the statistical maps computed at the single-
subject level. This method takes the variability of effects across
subjects into account, thus permitting population-level inferences.
One between-subject factor (i.e., prime) with two levels (i.e., time
and money) was generated to compare differences in activation
for the predictor of interest (i.e., the “priming phase”). The global
threshold was set to p< 0.01, uncorrected. Threshold maps were
submitted to a region-of-interest-based correction for multiple
comparisons. The correction criterion is based on Monte Carlo
simulations calculating the likelihood of obtaining different clus-
ter sizes. After 1,000 iterations, the minimum cluster size threshold
that yielded a cluster-level false-positive rate of 0.05 was applied
to the statistical maps (in our case seven voxel). Combined with
relaxed single-voxel thresholds, this procedure will ensure a global
error probability of p< 0.05 (Forman et al., 1995; Goebel et al.,
2006).
Third, we compared predictors by performing a random-effects
GLM analysis at regions of interest (e.g., Reimann et al., 2011).
Regions of interests were defined both functionally and anatom-
ically (Lancaster et al., 2000), and included both the right insula
(at Talairach coordinates of x = 44, y =−26, z = 15) and the left
insula (at Talairach coordinates of x =−31, y =−23, z = 18).
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL RESULTS
Building on the results of Mogilner and Aaker (2009), we
expected a higher favorability rating in the time condition. To
test this hypothesis, we ran a one-tailed independent-samples
t -test to analyze whether participants rated their wristwatches
more favorable in the time condition than in the money con-
dition (the two-tailed test revealed non-significant differences).
As expected, favorability was significantly greater in the time
condition (M time= 3.68, SD= 0.87) than in the money condi-
tion (Mmoney= 3.18; SD= 1.07), t (42)= 1.70, p< 0.05. These
results replicate the behavioral findings of Mogilner and Aaker
(2009), who found that when consumers are primed with time,
their favorability ratings for products increase. However, data did
not reveal replication of the effect for three other products (i.e.,
mobile phone, MP3 player, and laptop computer); in particular,
differences were non-significant at p> 0.1.
NEUROIMAGING RESULTS
Consistent with prior research (e.g., Knutson et al., 2001a,b), we
focused our analyses of the neuroimaging data on the trial phases
in which emotional processes are most likely to operate: in our case,
we concentrated on the actual priming phase. Contrasting BOLD
responses during the time prime with BOLD responses during
the money prime, whole-brain analysis results revealed increased
activation in the right insula [t (42)= 3.39, p< 0.001], the left
insula [t (42)= 4.18,p< 0.001], and the left medial temporal gyrus
[t (42)= 3.88, p< 0.001]. The increases in insula and left medial
temporal gyrus activation, therefore, preceded the time-versus-
money effect. Figure 2 illustrates these activation changes, and
Table 3 summarizes additional information, including Talairach
coordinates and corresponding Brodmann areas. Further, we con-
ducted a random-effects ROI analysis, focusing on activation
changes in the insula. Results supported the findings from the
whole-brain analysis, revealing greater activation in both the right
insula [t (42)= 3.53; p< 0.05] and the left insula [t (42)= 4.13;
p< 0.05] for time compared to money.
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FIGURE 2 | Signiﬁcantly increased activation in the insula following the
time prime compared to the money prime. Note: The color bar shows the
t -values; colors from red to yellow indicate activation increases, and colors
from blue to green indicate activation decreases. The insula is encircled. (A)
shows right insula activation differences during the “priming phase,” and (B)
shows left insula activation differences during the “priming phase.”
Table 3 | Activation changes for time compared to money during the “priming phase.”
aerannamdorBerehpsimeHaeraniarB x y z t (42) p
4431thgiRalusnI −26 15 3.96 0.0003
31tfeLalusnI −31 −23 18 4.18 0.0001
Medial temporal gyrus Left 21 −67 −44 0 3.88 0.0004
N= 43; random-effects general linear model. Brain areas, Brodmann areas, andTalairach coordinates (Talairach andTournoux, 1988) refer to the peak activation voxel
within each cluster of continuous voxels at a global threshold of p< 0.01 (uncorrected) and a minimum cluster threshold of seven voxel to ensure a total maximum
false activation rate of 0.05.
Purchasing a product implies paying a certain amount of
money in exchange for it. Therefore, one might argue that with
an increasing amount of money paid for a product, the amount
of psychological pain associated with this product also increases
when reminded (i.e., primed) of money (Prelec and Loewenstein,
1998; Soman, 2001). Because the insula also plays a role in process-
ing negative emotions such as pain (Sawamoto et al., 2000),we had
to account for such a possibility. Using the amount of money paid
for the wristwatch as an approximation for the possible amount
of pain felt, we analyzed the data using a linear regression model,
which included the product rating as the dependent variable and
the prime, actual amount paid, and time spent using the wrist-
watch as independent variables.Wehypothesized that, if increasing
amounts of money result in increased pain felt when money was
made more salient, the product rating should be lower for higher
amounts of money paid. We submitted data to a regression analy-
sis to test if the amount of money paid predicted participants’
ratings of the wristwatch. The results of the regression indicated
the predictor did not explain a signiﬁcant proportion of variance
in mean rating scores [R2 = 0.062, F(1,42)= 2.69, p> 0.10]. It
was also found that the amount paid did not signiﬁcantly predict
mean rating scores, b = 0.24, t (42)= 1.64, p> 0.10. The result
shows that the amount of money paid did not have a signiﬁcant
effect on the rating.
DISCUSSION
Prior research suggests certainmindset sonwhich the time-versus-
money effect is based. In particular, individuals in a temporal
mindset apparently weigh emotional factors more heavily than
individuals in a monetary mindset, who seem more objective in
their processing (Mogilner and Aaker, 2009).
In this realm, the present research provides novel insight into
the neurophysiological underpinnings of this effect.Our investiga-
tion shows that priming subjects with time (compared to money)
is associatedwith signiﬁcantly greater activation in the insula (both
in the left and right hemisphere of the brain) and the left medial
temporal gyrus.
The insula has been found to be a crucial brain region in
diverse but related psychological phenomena, such as urging and
addiction (Naqvi and Bechara, 2009), loss aversion (Knutson and
Bossaerts, 2007; Knutson et al., 2007), interpersonal love (Bartels
and Zeki, 2000, 2004; Beauregard et al., 2009), and brand love
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(Reimann et al., 2012). Conceptually, these psychological func-
tions are closely related to Mogilner and Aaker’s (2009) notion
of a time-versus-money effect, which argues in favor of a greater
personal connection between consumer and product during time
primes rather than during money primes. Besides the insula, other
regions that might be expected to be associated with this task
(i.e., other areas of the reward network or the amygdala, anterior
cingulate cortex, and orbitofrontal cortex) did not show a signifi-
cant neural difference between the time and money primes in our
study. However, the medial temporal gyrus did show a substantial
difference in activation between both primes. The medial tem-
poral gyrus is part of a functional neuronal circuit that plays an
important role in unconscious timekeeping and unconscious time
estimation (Coull et al., 2004; Morillon et al., 2009). We speculate
in saying that in a time prime greater usage of subject’s memory
could have taken place. The time prime possibly led participants
to more intense thoughts on the time spent with the product.
Engaging participants more strongly in the stage of recapitulation
of time may have resulted in unconscious time estimation and
evaluation. Moreover, the medial temporal gyrus also appears to
be related to craving; it has been found in connection with other
brain areas in Goudriaan et al. (2010) and craving for basic needs
like breathing (Liotti et al., 2001).
Thus, our result of increased activation in both the insula and
the medial temporal gyrus in response to time primes may suggest
that participants in the time condition were more attuned to an
internal state of urging or product craving elicited by the prime
than those in the money condition. Therefore, the finding from
our neuroimaging experiment possibly explains the behavioral
differences in product evaluations identified in previous research
(Mogilner and Aaker, 2009) and replicated in this study. Because
the time prime possibly elicited a more emotional mindset (as
evidenced by increased insula activation – a limbic region) than
the money prime, participants rated products as more favorable
during the time prime than during the money prime. Because
participants rated a product to which they had established a close
relationship, the time prime could have increased such a feeling
of closeness to the product, while the money prime could have
decreased those feelings and possibly have triggered a feeling of
distance. Indeed, previous behavioral work indicates that money
mindsets lead to greater physical distancing (Vohs et al., 2006).
Besides making important contributions to research on the
time-versus-money effect, the present study also has some limi-
tations, which provide opportunities for future research. First, the
insula has been found to be activated in cognitive tasks without
a clear involvement of emotions, for example, working memory
tasks (Cohen et al., 1997). Because the insula plays a role in many
different emotional and motivational processes, the conceptual
link between the identified neurophysiological processes and psy-
chological phenomena, such as urging or relationship closeness, is
not yet fully understood. Interesting questions could be answered
from here: Are emotional mindsets induced by the time prime
more similar to cravings or urges for additive substance than to
other, less intense affective experiences? Would we observe simi-
lar activities in the insula when feelings of connection are directly
induced without involving any priming of time?
Second, the medial temporal cortex has been found to be acti-
vated in many other functions unrelated to emotions, for example,
the processing of written and heard language within the lexico-
semantic network (De Zubicaray et al., 2001; Chen et al., 2002)
and in conjunction with a broader neural network to episodic
memory retrieval and encoding (Nyberg et al., 2000). This, in
turn, could speak in favor of alternative explanations. As such,
the role of the medial temporal gyrus in the time-versus-money
effect needs further investigation. Future research may, for exam-
ple, implement manipulations of urgings during time and money
priming to further investigate the identified effects.
Third, we acknowledge that the term “mindset,” which was first
used by Mogilner and Aaker (2009) in this context, may hold dif-
ferent meanings in different contexts. A mindset is often defined
as an established set of assumptions, thoughts, and beliefs held by
a group of people (Gollwitzer, 1990). In the case of time-versus-
money primes, this definition is debatable, because of the relatively
short temporal duration of mental states induced by priming (Isen
and Gorgoglione, 1983; Bargh et al., 1988).
Fourth, we note that in this research the time-versus-money
effect did not replicate behaviorally for several other products (i.e.,
mobile phone, MP3 player, and laptop computer), which is why we
focused on one specific product for which it did replicate (here: the
wristwatch). Future research could, thus, hone the experimental
design to study the underlying processes of the time-versus-money
effect for other product categories.
This research also provides implications for consumer behav-
ior research. As Mogilner and Aaker (2009) already pointed out,
research on time versus money highlights the power of contextual
manipulations (e.g., option framing or choice set construction) to
shift preferences (Simonson, 1989; Simonson and Tversky, 1992;
Mogilner and Aaker, 2009). Because the psychological context in
which attitudes are elicited seems to matter, it will be interesting
for future research to further investigate the neural mechanism
behind this kind of manipulation. Mogilner and Aaker (2009)
further posited important implications for research on intraper-
sonal consistency. Specifically, they suggest that time might be a
greater source of dissonance than money, and thus, a stronger dri-
ver of individuals’ ultimate attitudes. Our results support the point
that time and money are not readily interchangeable in behavioral
manipulations; both elicit different neural responses, suggesting
a difference in the underlying mental processes operating when
dealing with time compared to money. Boundary conditions of
the time-versus-money effect imposed by different cultural back-
grounds are another promising avenue to explore. Specifically,
does the effect remain robust in cultures in which the meaning
of money and time fundamentally differs?
From an applied perspective, this research provides novel
insights for marketers on the underpinnings of the time-versus-
money effect. The insight that an easily applied time prime could
lead to an urge for a brand/product and, in turn, might increase
brand/product likeability has important implications for the field
of advertising.
Taken as a whole, this research speaks extensively to the diverse
research community involved in research on time and money. Even
though our research might raise a new set of questions, we believe
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that it may also provide meaningful answers on some of the psy-
chological and neurophysiological differences between time and
money.
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